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Summary  findings
Uncertainty  is inherent  in the analysis  of global  warming  undcr  unccrtainty  - in particular,  that on the option-
issues.  Not only  is there  considerable  scientific  valuation  approach.
unccrtainty  about  the magnitude  of global  warming,  but  Their  numerical  applications  focus  on Cline's  (1992)
even  if that problem  were resolved,  there  is uncertainty  analysis  of global  warming,  but it may  be applied  to a
about  what monetary  value  to assign  to the  costs  and  range  of global  warming  analyses.
benefits  of various  policies  to reduce  global  warming.  First,  they  assess  whether  it is optimal  to implement
And  yet  the influence  of uncertainty  in policymakers'  Cline's  strategy  of limiting  global  warming  today,  or
decisions  is  ignored  in most  studies  of the issue.  whether  it should  be postponed,  and for how  long
Baranzini,  Chesney,  and Morisset  try to explicitly  Then,  they  identify  the optimal  policy  to be
incorporate  the effect  of uncertainty  on the choice  of  implemented  today  for different  levels  of uncertainty
global  warming  abatement  policies.  The  approach  they  about  the  costs  and benefits  of policies  to reduce  global
develop  draws  on the emerging  literature  on investment  warming.
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Uncertainty  is  an inherent  phenomena  in global  warmning  issues. First, there
is considerable  scientific  uncertainty  around the magnitude  of global warming,  and
second,  even  if this problem  was resolved,  it remains  difficult  to measure  in monetary
tenns the benefits  and the costs associated  with the policies  aimed at reducing  global
warming. Although  uncertainty  affects  the policy-makers'  decision  to reduce  (or not)
global warming,  such  an influence  is ignored  in most existing  studics.
The aim of this paper is to explicitly  incorporate  the effect of uncertainty  on
the choice  of global warming  abatement  policies. The approach  developed  in this
paper is related to the emerging  literature on investment  under uncertainty,  and in
particular  to the option-valuation  approach. Our numerical  applications  will focus  on
Cline's (1992)  analysis  of global  wanning, but our approach  may be applied  to a wide
range of global  warming  analyses  presented  in the literature. We are able to obtain
two kind of results.  First, we assess whether  it is optimal  to implement  a given
strategy  of limiting  global  wanning today  or whether  it should  be postponed,  and for
how long.  Second, we identify  the optimal policy to be implemented  today, for
different levels of  uncertainty  around the costs and benefits of  limiting global
warming.1  Introduction
Global  wanning has received  considerable  attention  in the last few years, yet
few concrete  actions  have  taken  place. Recently,  Cline  (1992)  and Nordhaus  (1993)
have shown that, from an economic  perspective, the resulting recommendations
greatly depend  on some key issues. First, it is necessary  to evaluate  the costs and
benefits of limiting global warming.  Second, these benefits  and costs should be
evaluated in a  reference period and discounted  accordingly.  Third, one should
consider  uncertainties  about  evolving  scientific  knowledge  and  economic  environment.
This paper focuses on the issue of uncertainty. In the context of global
warming  uncertainty  affects  the  decision-maldng  through  two  kinds  of irreversibilities,
that work in opposite  directions. First, uncertainty,  as already  pointed  in the seminal
work by Weisbrod  (1964), Arrow  and Fisher (1974)  and Henry (1974), delays the
decision  on an irreversible  action  if the passage of time is likely  to bring significant
new information. This is particularly  true for global wanming,  in which  the political
and economic  repercussions  of abandoning  policy actions  once they are well under
way  are so high as to make  abandonment  impracticable. Second,  uncertainty  biases
the  traditional  cost-benefit  analysis  against  policy adoption. It may be desirable  to
adopt a policy now, even though  the traditional  analysis  declares  it uneconomical,
because  greenhouse  gases  possess  long lifetime, increasing  the level of irreversible
damages  compared  to that if the action  was taken  from the start.
The approach developed  in this paper will be  related to the emerging
literature  on investment  decision  under  uncertainty,  in particular  to the option-valua-
tion approach. In this paper, we will obtain two kdnds  of results.  First, we will
assess whether it is optimal to implement a given strategy of limiting  global warming
today  or whether  it should  be postponed,  and for how long. Second,  we will identify
the optimal  policy  to be implemented  today, for different  levels  of uncertainty  around
Ithe costs  and benefits  of limiting  global  warming.
The option  pricing  approach  developed  in this paper can be applied  to a wide
range of global wanning projections  presented  in the literature, but our numerical
applications  will focus  on the recent  aggressive  policy  proposed  by Cline  (1992). The
impact  of changes  in uncertainty  on the optimal  date  of intervention  of this proposal
will be closely  examined  throughout  the paper. In the face  of uncertainty,  the optimal
strategy  could be to wait, or, eventually,  to proceed with a less aggressive  policy.
Cline's  proposal  is to limit  the level  of CO 2 emission  to 4 GtC  annually,  but a ceiling
of 5.5-6.5  GtC --about  the existing  level  in 1990--  seems  more  appropriate  for a level
of uncertainty  ranging  around 8-10  percent  annually. This results, we believe,  have
high  policy  content  and are in line with European  Union's recent  proposals.
The paper proceeds  as follows. In section  2 we review  the basic theory  of the
option  pricing  model. Section  3 introduces  Cline's  cost-benefit  analysis  and integrates
the option  pricing model in this approach. Section 4 concludes  and presents  some
qualifications.
2  The Option-Pricing  Model
The  economically  optimal  decision  to invest  depends  on the benefits  and costs
associated  with a given  project  or policy  proposal. Typically, the discounted  benefits
(V)  and costs (P) of reducing  global  warming  are expressed  as follows:
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where r is the appropriate  discount  rate, and T the  time horizon. The discounted  costs
are the monetary  costs of abatement  policies, while  discounted  benefits  are the level
of damage avoidance --the difference between  the cost of  global warming in the
absence  of intervention  and the costs of global warming  which can not be avoided
because  greenhouse  gases  possess many years  of life once they are emitted.
In conventional  models, a policy will be implemented  when discounted  benefits
are greater than discounted  costs (V/F> 1).  Although  this approach is typically
applied  in the global  warming  context,  it suffers  from  two major shortcomings.  First,
it does not account  for the uncertainty  surrounding  the costs and benefits  of limiting
global  warming. One way  around has been  to calculate  different  scenarios  and assign
probabilities,  but only a few number  of outcomes  can be considered. Second,  it does
not consider  the possibility  of waiting  to take advantage  of better information. As
discussed  in the introduction,  the decision  to invest  can be considered  as irreversible
because  it requires initial investments  on the order of hundreds  of billions  of dollars
a year (see Cline (1992) for some detailed  figures). Therefore, the policy-makers
have  strong incentives  to wait in order to acquire  additional  information  and thus the
decision  to wait has a value. The question  is how to derive the value (or the price)
to wait and to detemnnine  the optimal  time of intervention.
The financial  literature  provides  useful tools  to calculate  the price of waiting  and
the critical threshold  ratio of benefits to costs which renders the policy efficient.
3Indeed,  an irreversible investment is  similar to  a  financial call  option where  in
exercising the  decision to  invest, the  policy-maker forgoes the  potential gains of
postponing the decision.  We use the model developed by  Samuelson (1965) and
McDonald and Siegel (1986) and known as the perpetual option model, also called:
the option to wait to invest.
The benefit to cost ratio is defined as Y =  V/F.  The critical level at which it
becomes optimal to implement  the policy is Y', which is greater than 1 because of the
value to  wait to  invest.  For  simplicity, we assume that Y follows  a  geometric
Brownian process:
dY = 1&d:  +  adz  (3)
where u is the drift of the process, a its volatility, and z a Brownian motion.
We assume that the drift and the volatility are constant over time.  In our
numerical simulations, the first variable will be determined  by Cline's analysis, while
the second one will be defined exogenously.  One major caveat is that disasters cannot
be analyzed because this stochastic process  assumes that the benefit/cost ratio is
continuous (on this topic, see Drepper and Mansson (1993)).
Assuming a  perpetual and  american  option,  McDonald and  Siegel  (1986),
following Samuelson (1965), have demonstrated that the option value (W) at time u
can be written as;:
2. W is the  discounted  expected  pay-off  in a risk-adjusted  economy.  In  equation  (4), (Y*-l)F is equivalent  to the
pay-off  of early exercise. (VY/F)' is an  expected  discount  factor.
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where rv =  (r - Gv  ) and rF =  (r -GF  ) denote the effective discount rates,  (GV  the
growth rate of benefits, GF the growth rate of costs, cFv  and aF the standard deviations
of benefits and costs respectively, a: the total variance associated with the variable Y.
and OeV  the correlation coefficiene.
The investment decision is optimal when the benefit to cost ratio is greater than
the critical ratio (Y > Y)  as the value to invest in the future is lower or equal than that
of investing today (W <  F - V).  Yet the value of the option to wait to invest could
be large enough to invalidate the usual decision rule, to invest when benefits exceed
costs. In effect, the correct decision rule under such circumstances shouild  be to invest
when benefits exceed the costs by an amount at least equal to the value of the lost
(foregone) option.
The influence of (exogenous) uncertainty is explicitly taken into account in the
decision maldng process.  Overall, an increase in uncertainty (o2)  augments the value
3.  Here  the risk premium is assumed to be zemr.
5to invest  in the future as compared  with that of investing  today; (dW/do 2 >  0).'  If
uncertainty  is higher, the value of waiting  to receive more infornation is indeed
higher and the required  flexibility  premium  should  be higher too.  In the numerical
application,  we will see that the investment  decision  is very sensitive  to the estimate
or perception  of the underlying  uncertainty.  One  caveat  is in order at this point. The
uncerainty  is assumed  to be exogenous,  but it can be influenced  by the damages  from
global  warming  and the degree  of policy  intervention  --uncertainty  may increase  (or
alternatively  decrease)  with the level of cumulative  emission  from the use of fossil
fuel.,
As discussed  in the introduction,  not only is the optimal investment  timing
influenced  by the possibility  of  waiting for better information,  but also by the
evolution  of irreversible  damages  during  the waiting  period. Two basic  assumptions
can be tested  in the model. First, it can be assumed  that irreversible  damages  would
remain  constant,  whatever  is the starting  date  of intervention. The advantage  is that
the expected  time when  the investment  will take  place can be directly  deduced  from
the option-pricing  approach:'
ln(YFIV)  if  G  - GF >  °  and V C
E(T) Gv  - GF  8
E(T)  =  O  if Gv - GF  > O  and V  >  YE
F
Second, it is certainly  more realistic  to assume that the level of irreversible
damages  is correlated  positively  with  the length  of the waiting  period. Postponing  the
intervention  will therefore  translate  into  a higher  level  of CO 2 emission  which,  in turn,
4. Note  that  this is not always  true for  the individual  standards  deviations,  since  the total  effective  standard  deviation
is a quadratic  function  of the two standard  deviations  and the correlation, see the Appendix.
5. On this issue, see the recent paper by Chichilnisky  and Heal (1993).
6. For a prof  see World  Bank (1991).
6will incrcase  the temperature  and irreversible  damages,  shortening  the waiting  period
in comparison  to that suggested  by equation  (8). In that case, we will determine the
optimal  timing  by simulating  the Cline's  proposal  with  different  dates of intervention,
starting  from 1990  (as  proposed  by Cline). The  optimal  timing  will be determined  by
the furst  date when  the benefit  to cost ratio is greater  tnan the critical  ratio (Y  > Y*).
This exercise  will be done in the next section.
In short, the model  can thus be used (i) to determine  if governments  should
intervene  to reduce  global  warming;  (ii) to examine  the influencc  of uncertainty  on the
process; (iii) to determine  the optimal  date of intervention;  and (iv) to identify  the
optimal  level of CO 2 cutback  to be implemented  today.
3  An Application
The objective  of this section  is to apply the option-pricing  model developed  in
the preceding  section. In order to proceed  with application  we need two types  of
data:
*  The estimated  costs and benefits  associated  to the abatement  in global
warming, as well as the relevant  discount  rate.  This data will be extracted
from Cline's analysis.
* Variables  relevant  to the option  model,  such  as quantitative  measures  for  the
underlying uncertainty (on costs and benefits), specifically  the  sandard
deviation  of uncertain  variables  and the correlation  between  these variables.
73.1  The Basdine Scenario
The analysis  presented  by Cline (1992)  is certainly  the most thorough  study  of
climate  change  and, therefore,  it will be used as a reference  for our baseline  scenario
in the absence  of uncertainty. However, it is worth underscoring  that two aspects
from the original model have been modified:  First, the expected increase in
temperature  from global  warning will be explicitly  linked  to the CO 2 emission  rather
than to  be determined by a  linear approximation  between the  long-term global
warming and the current level of tempeature.  Second, the ratio of unavoidable
damages  to total damages  in the absence  of intervention  will not be fixed during the
entire period, but it will vary over time in response  to the variations  in the stock of
CO 2 .
Expected  Costs
In  the recent literature,  the cost  of abaten"'nt  polices are generally  detennined
by: (i) afforestation  or diminishing  deforestation;  (ii) energy  substitution  -non-fossil
fuel for fossil  fuel energies;  (ffl)  non-energy  inputs substitution  --capital  and labor  for
energy; (iv) change in product mix;  (v) adaptive measures such as  population
migrations;  (vi) 'climatic  engineering' such as ocean fertilizaon.
Accordingly, Cline  considers  that the costs of abatement  policy  basically  arise
from the reduction  in fossil  fuel emissions  due to output  reduction  (Q), the need  tO  set
aside land for affoation  (FA), and the need  to curtail  frontier  agricultural  land use
and thereby  carbon release  from deforestation  (FD). These  costs  are expanded  by the
proportion (w)  to  take into account likely costs associated with  curtailing all
greenhouses  gases in a way commensurate  with reducing  carbon dioxide emissions.
This cost is further increased  by considering  the portion  of the cost that would have
8gone into investment  (x).  Therefore,  the costs of abatement  polices  at time t (in
percent of World GDP)  can be estimated  by:
CD '  (Q  FA, +  D,) (I  + w)x  (9)
rGDP,
where GDP,  is world GDP at time t.
Clearly,  the cost  associated  with Q varies  with the level  of abatement  as shown
by Cline.  This basic equation  is defined  as follows: 7
(E,  - K  - '-  RF')  - Z[ 1[a f+  .y(t  - 35)1  (10)
(E,  - E4 o
with:
Zo  = percentage  carbon reduction  at zero cost (set a 22 percent).
E'o  = Base year deforestaion emissions (set a 1 billion ton of Carbon (GtC).
o  = Abatement  cost parameter  (set at 0.0678)
y  = Abatement  cost parameter  (set at -0.00039)
K  = target ceiling emission  (set at 4 GtC)
At=  Level of global carbon emission at time t (baseline)
RFA,  = Emission  reduction  from afforestation (set at 1.6 GtC per year, 1991-2020)
RvPt  = Emission reduction from lower deforestation (set at 0.7 GtC per year, 1991-
2275)
FImally,  the parameters  w and  x are defmed  to be equal  to 0.2 and 1.12 of total
7. Now that equation (10) is slightly  different  over the period 1990-2025  (see Cline (1992), p. 282 for detils).
9costs respectively,  foUowing  the arguments  proposed  by Cline.
For the aggressive  policy  of 4 GtC of CO 2 emissions  annually  proposed  by
Cline, the estimated  costs for the period 1990-2275  are depicted  in Figure I and in
Table  1.'  The estimates  assume  that  a reduction  of up to 22 percent  of emissions  can
be achieved  at zero cost, on the basis of the body of engineering  estimates. The
overall  pattern  that emerge  is one in which  there  is a phase of initially  low cost  carbon
reductions,  followed  by a period when  these costs rise to a peak of 3.5 percent of
World GDP, a level that then tapers  off to some  2.5 percent of GDP as the passage
of time should  permit  the development  of a wider  range  of technological  alternatives.
It is worth  underscoring  that  these  projections  are calculated  on the  basis  of the
costs measured  by Cline (1992),  but a considerable  debate is taldng  place currently
in the literdture.  For example,  important  additional  damage  estimates  have  been  made
by Titus  (1992)  and Fankhauser  (1992),  the fit  author author  arguing  that potential
damages  in forest loss are much more important  than estimated  by Cline, while  the
second  one have extended  Cline's analysis by including  a  more extensive  set of
countries.  The model can be easily extended  to include alternative  measures  of
damages  costs.
Expected Benefits
Expected  benefits  are defined  as the damages  that can be avoided  by a policy
8. The parmeter x is defined  by Cline as follows:
x  =  (1 - a1  )  +  P  k  Tk
with -l  the portion  of the cost that would  have gone into investment,  and P*k  a shadow  price of capital to convert
investment  in consumption-equivalents.
9. The time  horizon  of 2275 is fixed by Cline,  because  at that time, it is believed  that reources will be exhauted
under a scemunio  of high fossil fuel consumption.
10or,  in other terms, as the differences between the damages in the absence of
intervention  and the unavoidable  damages.  The furst requirement  is therefore  to
detemine the damages  of global warming  in the absence  of intervention. Damages
from global  warming  are determined  by the estimated  increase  in temperature;  which
largely  depends  on the so-called  climate  sensitivity  parameter.
In expression  (11)  is specified  the linkage  between  the increase  in temperatue
from global  wanning  and the level of CO 2 emission. Two scenarios  are successively
examined  (the central and the high cases) which correspond to an increase in
temperature  in the long term of about 10 C° and 18 C° respectively.' 0 The increase
in the level of temperature  is assumed  to depend  on (i) the degree of radiative  force
above  industial level, which in tum is influenced  by the level of CO 2 concentration
at time t, (ii) the relationship  between  the degree  of radiative  force and the increase
in temperature,  and (iii) the feed-back  effect caused  by water vapour, snow and ice
albedo. In short, global warming  is defined  as follows:
0.  476  (4  +  0.5  Et  (1
Wr  = 6.3In[  - C  r ] )4
where ZO  is the initial atmospheric  concentfation  of carbon dioxide in 1990, E, the
C02  emission  at time  t, X  warming  per unit of radiative  forcing  before  utking  account
the feedback  effect (set a 0.3), and B is the feedback  multiplier (set at 1.9 in the
central  case and 3.4 in the high case). The values  of these  parameters  are those  used
by Cline (1992).
The increase  in temperature  will produce  world  damages  that are esfimated
10. The 'central casoe is in line with the IPCC estimates,  while  the 'high case' is relatively  pesimistic.
11on the basis of studies on the U.S. economy."  The central estimate  for economic
damage  from global  warming  is set by Cline  at I percent  of world  GDP at benchmark
of doubling  CO 2 concentration. Finally, the function  relating  damage  to warming is
assumed to  be geometric with an  exponent of  1.3.  Therefore, non-discounted
damages (in  percent of  world GDP) from  global warming in  the  absence of
intervention  are given by:
-D'P  = (doZ5)1  (12)
GDP  U,  2.5
where do is the benchmark  economic  damage  for carbon-dioxide-equivalent  doubling
(set at  1 and calibrated for a  climate sensitivity of 2.5  C°), W, the projected
temperatre at  time t  as  defined by  equation (I1),  and  y the  exponent in  the
geometrical  function  (set a 1.3).
Equations  (11)  and (12)  can be used to determine  the costs of global warming
in the absence of intervention  --the accumulation  of carbon dioxide leads to an
increase  in temperature  which, in turn, produce damages  to the world economy.
In Cline's approach,  the benefits  from an aggressive  abatement  policy are fixed
at 80 percent of the costs of global  wanning in the absence  of intervention  during the
entire period. This fraction,  equivalent  to the unavoidable  dLmages  in the long term,
overestirnates  the benefits  from intervention  in the beginning  of the period since the
level of greenhouse  gases is higher in 1990 (6.7 GtC) than the ceiling proposed by
Cline (4 GtC).  A more precise approach is here followed since the benefits are
It.  The general approach has been to analyze  the different economic  sectors affected  by global warming. Some
problems  arise for agriculture, with the controversial  so-called  ferdlization  effect,  according  to which CO%  concentration
may, up to a certain level, improve  photosynthesis. Other major problems  concem the monetary  value of non-maket
damages, such as helth  effects, changing  amenities, species extinction  and social  costs of migrtions  due to sea-level
rise.  The indirect damages, due to greenhouse  gases and conventional  air pollutants  should also be included in the
estimates  (Ayres and Walter, 1991).
12measured  as the difference  between  the costs of global warming  in the absence  of
intervention Bij) and those if the global CO 2 emission is limited at 4 GtC (B').
Thus:
il"'  B.(
b,  GDP,  GDP,)  v  '  (13)
The benefits  from intervention  are further expanded  to take into consideration
the fact that some of these gains accrue to production  going into investment  (the
parameter  iq  is set a 1.06 following  Cline's analysis)  and the benefit from reduction
of the excess  tax burden (T).
The evolution  of the expected  benefits  of an aggressive  abatement  in global
warming is described  in Figure 1 and Table l.  It is worth underscoring  that the
fraction of avoidable damages is not constant  over time as originally assumed by
Cline. As depicted  in Figure 2, this ftaction  is only 45-50 percent in the first decades
and gradually  increase  up to 82 percent in 2275. Benefits  of limiting  global  warming
would be considerably  higher in the long-term  than in the short-term  because  of the
importance  of the inreversible  accumulation  ef CO 2 and thus unavoidable  damages  in
the first decades.
Cost-Benefit  Analysis
As discussed by Cline, the results of the cost-benefit analysis are greatly
influenced  by the discount  rate (r) because  of the long time horizon  (up  to 285 years).
Although  the  is an ongoing debate on tfis issue, we remain attached  to Cline's
analysis by using a  relatively low discount rate of  1.5 percent. 12 The rtio  of
12.  By incorporating  the influence  of the portion  of resources  diverted  from capitl  investment  by applying  a shadow
prie  on capital and  converting thes reurces  to consmption  equivalents. the overall discount  te is close to 2 percent.
For an extensive discussion on the issue of the discount rate, see for example, Birddl  and  Steer (1993).




with C, and b, defined  in equations  (9) and (13) respectively.
The results  that emerge  from the traditional  cost-benefit  analysis  are that the
aggressive  policy should  be rejected  in the central  case because  the ratio  Y is lower
than 1 (Y=0.94).  In contmst, in the high case, the aggressive abatement  policy
should be implemented  since the discounted  benefits  are largely greater than the
discounted  costs of intervention  (Y =  1.94).'
Therefore,  the results  of the traditional  cost-benefit  analysis  do not permit  to
support  or to reject aggressive  abatement  policies. However, Cline concludes  that
these  empirical  results  support  his policy  proposal  to the extent  that policy-makers  are
risk averse  and apply a higher  weight  to the high case scenario  than the central  case
scenario.
3.2 Parameters for the Option Pricing Model
As explained  in the preceding  sections,  our objective  is to introduce  uncertainty
in the analysis  of global  waming.  The  principal  questions  to be answered  are: should
we invest  now in the aggressive  abatement  policy  advocated  by Cline or should  we
13. These  ratios  slightly  differ  from those  found  by Cline  because  the tempeoates and so the benefits  from
intervention  are not defined  in the same ways. If we use the same  approach  than Cline, the benefit-cost  ratios ae  0.77
and 1.59  for the central and high cases respectively,  close to the results  obtained  by Cline (chapter  7, scearios I and
9).
14wait, and if yes how long?  Finally, what would be the appropriate  policy to be
implemented  today?
There appears to be much more uncertainty  about the benefits of global
warming  abatement  than about  costs in the literature  (as reflected  in TAbles  2 and 3).
The major source  of uncertainty  regarding  the benefits  lies in the uncertainties  and
impondemble  impacts  of climate  change  (scientific  uncertainty),  but major  doubts  also
remain  on the magnitude  of the damages,  and their conversion  in monetary  values.
The uncertainty  about the costs of limiting  global warming  principally lies in the
choice  of instruments  to be implemented  (e.g. carbon tax, regulations). 4
To illustrate  the degree of uncertainty,  Tables  2 and 3 report the estimates  of
recent  studies  on the expected  costs and benefits. The estimated  costs of a 40 percent
abatement  policy from baseline  in 2025 range from only 0.26 percent of World GDP
for Edmonds-Bums  to 3.52 percent  for Whally-Wigle,  while  the estimatod  benefits  (of
eliminating  the damages of CO 2 doubling) 15 vary between 0 and 5.5 percent of
GDP.  1 6 The overall  uncertainty  of costs and benefits  in 2025 is 74 percent and 107
percent respectively,  equivalent  to a standard  deviation  of about 3.2 percent and 3.8
percent  annually.
The correlation  coefficient  between  discounted  benefits  and costs of global
warming  also influences  greatly  the optimal  timing  of intervention  --the critical ratio
14. See Nordhaus  (1993).  for a good summary  of the uncertainties  of limifing  global warming.
15. Which is expected  to occur as early as 2025 (IPCC, 1990).
16. Although  Nordhaus  (1993)  reports  that most studies  give  quite similar  results  and find damages  rnging between
1.0-1.5% US 1988  GDP for a CO 2 doubling  and a survey of scientific  and economic  experts by Nordhaus  (1993) shows
that a 3 C  increase  of average  temperature  in 2090 would  cost on average 1.8% of GDP, an order of value close to
the preceding  ones,  the great dispersion  of the answers, ranging from 0 to 5.5% of GDP, illuswrates  the uncertainty
surrounding  these estimations.
15(Y*) is a decreasing function  of this coefficient.  If benefits and costs are poorly
correlated, the effect of uncertainty  would increase since there will always be the
possibility of  having simultaneously  higher than expected costs and lower than
expected  benefits.  The correlation  coefficient,  calculated  by the standard  formula,
equals  0.065 (see Table 4).
From equations  (9) and (13), we infer that the annual average growth rate of
benefits  (G.) is 0.9 percent in the high case and 0.8 percent in the central case, while
the annual  growth  rate of costs (GF) is 0.02 percent.1 7 Tbe discount  rte  (r) remains
the one applied by Cline (1.5 percent).
All parameters are summarized in Table 4.  The option-pricing model is
successively  applied to the centml and high cases.  The introduction  of uncertinty
does not delay the investment  decision  in the high case scenario,  but accentuated  the
non-profitability  of policy intervention  in the centrl  case scenario. Below  are some
details.
High Case:  In the face of uncertainty,  the decision  to proceed  now remains
optimal. However,  as discussed  below in detail, this result is quite sensitive
to the volatility  associated  with the costs and benefits.
Central Case: Policy  intervention  is even less attractive,  when  analyzing  it in
the face  of uncertainty. The optimal  time of investment  would  be in about 133
years  from now. This result  may appear  redundant,  knowing  the deterministic
result, but it reveals  option  prices (i.e. the variable  W in Table 4).
17. Defind as geometric  average growth raztes  per annum for the period 1990-2275.
16Sensitivity Analysis
The decision  to invest  is sensitive  to the degree  of uncertainty  as depicted  in
Table S  for the high  and most  pessimistic  case of global  warming. When  the volatility
of benefits  and costs is lower  than 6 percent  annually,  it remains  optimal  to invest
now in aggressive  policies  against  global warming.  In contrast, these aggressive
poLicies  should  be deferred  for about 35 years  with a volatility  of 6 percent,  72 years
with a volatility  of 8 percent  or 115  years with a volatility  of 10 percent.
As explained  earlier, the optimal date of intervention  will depend  on the
evolution of  irreversible damages during the  waiting period.  Following the
assumption  that the level of irreversible  damages  would remain the same as if the
action  was taken  from the start, the optimal  waiting  period  is defined  by equation  (8).
The results from this assumption  are summarized  In Table 5 (denoted  by E(m)).
However,  if the irreversible  damages  increase  over time, the waiting  period  will be
shorter. To illustrate,  assuming  a volatility  of 10  percent  per year, the optimal  delay
would  be about 115  years  compared  to 152 years  with constant  irreversible  damages.
Optimal  Policy
In the face of uncertainty, the aggressive  policy proposed by Cline may  appear
sub-optimal. The response  could be to wait, as examined  earlier, or, eventually,  to
proceed  with a less aggressive  policy.  The second  option  is actualy recommended
by Nordhaus  (1993)  who,  based  on the Dynamic  Integrated  Climate-Economy  (DICE)
model,  proposes  an initial  abatement  policy of 10-15  percent rather  than 40 percent
as proposed  by Cline. 18
18. Recently,  Clinie  (1993)  has however  shown  that the DICE  model  can reproduce  his results if the discount  rte
is appropriately  choen.Aithough  tde selection  of the discount rate is fundamental  for a period  of time over  300 years,
our objective  remais to examme  the impact  of uncerainty.
17Using the approach developed  in this paper, it is relatively easy to identify the
optimal poLicy  to be implemented today for a given degree of uncertainty.  Notice
that, for simplicity, we assume that the degree of uncertainty on costs and benefits are
equivalent, so that the resulting impact on the option value is unambiguously positive
as demonstrated in Appendix.  The results of this exercise are presented in the last
line of Table 5 in tenns of CO 2 ceiling.  For example, the optimal ceiling would be
only 6.4 GtC for a volatility of  10 percent, while it would decline to 4.8  GtC for a
volatility of 6 percent.  As expected, higher is the uncertainty around the cost and
benefits, lower should the CO 2 cutback.
Figure 3 depicts the optimal path of CO 2 emission over the period 1990-2275
for different degree of uncertainty.'9  The optimal path is sensitive to the degree of
uncertainty, specifically in the beginning of the period.  The optimal path, when the
uncertainty is around 8 percent annually, would cut emissions by 15-20 percent in the
first  decades from  baseline,  rising gradually  to  80 percent  in  the  next century.
However, when the uncertainty rises to  10 percent, the CO 2 cutback would be only
5-10 percent in the furst decades.  These results can be compared with the 40 percent
cutback recommended by Cline in the next few decades, and are close to the level
proposed by Nordhaus and those recommended recently by the European Union.
4  Concluding Remarks
Uncertainty is an inherent phenomena in global warming issues, and thus it
must be explicitly taken into account in the evaluation of policies.  Although the major
concern remains the uncertainty  around the scientific evidence of climate changes, the
economic analysis provides some guidance whether governments should intervene in
19. The abatement ratio is defined as the CO 2 cutback from baseline.
18the foreseen future.
On the basis of the option-valuation approach, this paper  has examined the
impact of uncertainty on the costs-benefits analysis.  The major conclusions are the
following:
* The aggressive proposal presented by Cline (1992) appears to be optimal for
a relatively low degree of uncertainty around the costs and benefits of limiting
global warming.  This  result  is  valid  in  the  case where  the  increase  in
temperature  in the long term  is about  18 C°  (high case scenario),  and the
discount rate is equal to  1.5.
*  However, the action should be delayed if the uncertainty is higher than 6
percent per annum.  The optimal date of intervention calculated in the paper,
ranging from 35 years to 126 years from now, accounts for the possibility to
accumulate future information and for the increase in  irreversible damages
during the waiting period compared to those which would have prevailed if the
action was taken from the start.
* In case of relative high uncertainty, it may be optimal to implement today
a less aggressive policy.  If the Cline's proposal is to limit the level of CO 2
emission to 4 GtC annually, a ceiling of 5.5-6.5 GtC --about the existing level
in 1990-  seems more appropriate for a level of uncertainty ranging around 8-
10 percent annually.
Finally, we would like to conclude that the approach followed in this paper
could be imprved  in numerous ways.  As discussed earlier, uncertainty around cost
and benefits is assumed to be exogenous and constant over time.  It would be certainly
more realistic to consider uncertainty as endogenous, varying, for example, with the
increase in global warming or the magnitude of the policies to limit global carbon
19emissions. Clearly,  additional  work is required  in this area in buth an analytical  and
empirical  perspectives.
20Appendix
In this appendix,  the impact  of changes in uncertainty  on the option value (W) is
discussed  in more  detail.  While  an increase  in the overall  uncertainty  on costs  and  benefits  (a)
will unambiguously  increase  the option  value and thus delay the implementation  of policies
against  global warming,  the impact  of variations  in individual  components  -uncertainty  on
benefits  (ri,) or on costs (crO)-  remains  ambiguous.  Below  is a detailed  description.
A. The Impact of a Change in Overal Uncertainty
Substituting  equation  (4) into  equation  (6), the option  value  can be written  as:
W . (Y'  - I)F(  VyY )r71r - i,
All variables  have  been  defined  in the main  text. The impact  of a change  in overall
uncertainty  is therefore  equal to:
dW  dW  dY'  d7
dc9  dY  dv  dr9
The sign  of dW/da 2 is unambiguously  positive,  as demonstrated  below:
dY  I_  <  O
d  (--lI)2
dW  W  [  In  1
dY-  (Y-  -I)  (Yi  --I)  F
dv  r  - 2 [(  FrV)  2  05r  - 2 F  F]rS.[(  )(  rF  V  0.5)  *
because  as  v  > 0
(aF  - av)2
21B. The Impact of a Change  in Individual Components  of Uncertainty
The  impact  of a variation  in the uncertainty  around  benefits  and costs on the option
value  can be expressed,  respectively,  as follows:
dW  dWdor  dW
dav  da2  dorv  do  2(  UVV¢)>  f 
dW-  dW  aV
_  =  _~2(arv  - OVFOF)  >  °  if  >  OVF
a is the vo,atility  of Y, which  is a ratio of benefits  (V) over costs (F).
From these two equations, we can observe that the impact of a change in the
individual  uncertainties  on the value of the option is ambiguous. For example,  the sigr of
the impact of a change in civ  on W depends on the values of: (i) the correlation between the
costs  and the benefits  associated  with  the policies  against  global  warming;  (ii) the uncertainty
on benefits;  (iii)  the uncertainty  on costs. To illustrate,  the option  value is more lik  to be
influenced  positively  by an increase  in the uncertainty  on benefits  (dW/dav  ) if the correlation
between  costs and benefits is low and if the uncertainty  on benefits is low relative  to the
uncertainty  on costs.
The numerical  exercise  simulated  in Table 5 of the main text assumes that the
variation  in the uncertainty  on costs equals  that in the uncertainty  on benefits  (daF  = dav )-
In this case, the  resulting impact on the option value is  unambiguously  positive, as
demonstrated  below:
dW =  - do,+ado,
aoF,  a°rv
= 2 d  (  + c)) ( I  - w)  do°F >  0
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24Tabe 1: Cost aud Benefits of Agragalwv  Abeatamn PoeIes. Hgh Case  Ssneulo
-Tene,atur  gi-  - BDenefit  hi-  Coste  hi  Avolable
Hioh  Case  4 CtC  Cline  Revised  cl  Damags  Rateo  di
1390  2.43  1.61  0.82  0.47  0.00  0.40
loSs  2.67  1.60  0.32  0.56  0.08  0.40
20oo  2.01  1.08  1.03  0.96  0.07  0.61
200Z  3.17  1.76  1.17  0.75  0.13  0.64
2010  3.44  1.95  1.40  1.01  0.83  0.60
2015  3.73  1.93  1.61  1.21  1.33  0.82
2020  4.03  2.01  1.73  1.39  1.87  0.64
2025  4.34  2.09  2.14  1.74  3.70  0.67
2030  4.06  2.10  2.29  1.09  3.73  0.05
2031  4.39  2.24  2.44  2.03  3.92  0.6a
2040  5.27  2.32  2.63  2.19  3.84  0.610
204  S..8  2.33  2.74  2.34  3.94  0.70
2050  5.89  2.47  2.30  2.11  3.92  0.71
205  6.20  2.-4  3.06  2.67  3.91  0.71
2060  6.62  2.61  3.22  2.85  3.77  0.72
2095  6.83  2.99  3.38  3.02  3.72  0.72
2070  7.13  2.76  3.66  3.20  3.66  0.73
2075  7.44  2.02  3.72  3.38  3.58  0.73
2O0  7.74  2.80  3.00  3.S0  3.51  0.74
208E  8.05  2.98  4.07  3.75  3.42  0.74
2090  8.35  3.03  4.26  3.14  3.33  0.74
2035  8.94  3.10  4.43  4.12  3.22  0.75
2100  9.94  3.16  4.61  4.31  3.10  0.76
2105  9.23  3.23  4.78  4.50  2.93  0.75
2110  0.61  3.30  4.06  4.68  2.35  0.76
211S  3.76  3.36  5.13  4.80  2.71  0.78
2120  10.06  3.42  6.31  5.04  2.00  0.76
2125  10.36  3.49  6.51  5.25  2.08  0.70
2130  10.70  3.55  6.73  5.43  2.69  0.77
213  ' 11.03  3O.  6.5  L.73  2.63  0.77
2140  11.38  3.07  6.17  L.07  2.S  0.77
2145  11.68  3.73  6.40  921  2.9B  0.78
2160  12.01  3.00  6.62  6.46  2.93  0.79
211  12.33  3.06  0.96  6.70  2.68  0.79
2160  12.66  "I0  7.07  6.96  2.9  0.79
2165  12.9B  3.97  7.30  7.19  2.98  0.79
2170  13.30  4.03  7.S3  7.44  2.95  0.79
2175  13.51  4.09  7.76  7.63  2.08  0.79
2130  13.33  4.15  7.38  7.34  2.G9  0.50
2136  14.24  4.20  8.21  8.13  2.69  0.50
2190  14.56  4.20  B.44  B.44  2.66  0.90
2139  14.89  4.31  8.67  8.69  2.66  0.30
2200  1.17  4.37  8.30  9.94  2.69  0.90
2205  16.47  4.42  9.13  9.19  2.65  0.80
2210  16.77  4.48  9.38  9."  2.66  0.81
2215  13.07  4.53  9.09  9.60  2.68  0.81
2220  1 .37  4.S9  9.31  9.34  2.69  0.91
222C  16.87  4.04  10.04  10.20  2.68  0.91
2230  16.93  4.83  10.27  10.45  2.66  0.91
2236  17.20  4.74  10.60  10.70  2.68  0.91
2Z40  17.65  4.79  10.73  10.93  2.69  0.82
2246  17.84  4.56  10.36  11.20  2.68  0.92
2250  L912  4.90  11.19  11.45  2.66  O.92
22R;  13L41  4.06  11.41  11.70  2.68  0.82
2230  13.63  5.00  11.64  11.95  2.66  0.93
225  18.97  5.06  11.97  12.20  2.96  0.92
2207  13.L2  5.10  12.09  12.45  2.69  0.82
2Z27  19.63  6.14  12.32  12.70  2.65  0.92
al Definmd  the Incess in temeiture  Imeasuws  in Celiu  degrel  from preindustial  level
in the abse*ce  ef hdrventnn  lBmarlne  en1na.
bi In perent of Wodi CDP. not  dinounted.
al  Det  ned bl egumtuo  1121  in the text.
di Ddiu  as h  ratio  of evolid  dantg  to  otil  dnagfercml  global  warmng.
25Table 2: Cost Uncertainty a/






Standard Deviation  1.30
Mean  1.74
Uncertainty bt  74.71
Source; Cline 119921
Table 3: Benefits Uncertainty cI
In Percent  of World GDP
Nordhaus (Al  1.00
Cline  1.10
Fakhauser  1.30
Nordhaus  (B)  1.80
Lowest  o.oo
Highest  5.50
Standard Deviation  1.91
Mean  1.78
Uncertainty bl  107.30
a/ Based  on estimated costs in 2025 and calibrated
for a 40 percent abatement policy from  baseline.
bI Defined  as the ratio of standard deviation to mean.
c/ Based  on Damages  of C02 doubling.
dJ Based  on a survey of specialists.
26Table 4:
Option-Pricing  Approach  a/
Central  High
Case  Case
Benefits volatility b/  3.80%  3.80%
Costs  volatility  b/  3.20%  3.20%
correlation  5.99%  5.99%
Discount  rate  1.50%  1.50%
Benefits  (V)  96.5  198.5
Costs  (F)  102.3  102.4
Benefits  growth  rate  0.81%  0.69%
Costs growth  rate  0.16%  0.38%
Eff. Benefits growth rate  0.690%  0.8 1%
Eff. Costs growth rate  1.34%  1.12%
Total volatility  0.23%  0.23%
1.8  2.4
Y*  2.2  1.7
Y  =(V/F)  0.9  1.9
W c/  494.0  1313.0
ElT), in years d/  133.6  -36.9
All variables are defined in the  text
a/ In percent of World GDP,  otherwise specified.
b/As determined  in Tables 2 and 3
cl  In trillions of 1990 US dollars.
dl Optimal  timing determined  by equation (81  in the text.
27Table  5:
High Case: Sensitivity Analysis  al
Changes  in Total Effective Volatility
Benefits  volatility  0.00%.  2.00%  4.00%  6.00%  8.00%  10.00%  12.00%
Costs  volatility  0.00%  2.00%  4.00%  6.00%  8.00%  10.00%  12.00%
Correlation  5.99%  5.99%  5.99%  5.99%  5.99%  5.99%  5.99%
Discount rate  1.50%  1.50%  1.50%  1.50%  1.50%  1.50%  1.50%
Benefits (V)  198.5  198.5  198.5  198.5  198.5  198.5  198.5
Costs (F)  102.4  102.4  102.4  102.4  102.4  102.4  102.4
Benefits growth  rate  0.69%  0.69%  0.69%  0.69%  0.69%  0.69%  0.69%
Costs  growth rate  0.38%  0.38%  0.38%  0.38%  0.38%  0.38%  0.38%
Eff. Benefits  growth  rate  0.81%  0.81  %  0.81%  0.81  %  0.81%  0.81%  0.81%
Et. Costs growth rate  1.12%  1.12%  1.12%  1.12%  1.12%  1.12%  1.12%
Total  volatility  0.00%  0.08%  0.30%  0.68%  1.20%  1.88%  2.71 %
x  na  2.9  2.2  1.9  1.6  1.5  1.4
vo  1.4  1.5  1.8  2.2  2.6  3.1  3.7
Y =(VIF)  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9
W  na  1252.1  1365.6  1715.1  2267.2  3044.6  4093.4
Optimal  Timing
EM, in years b/  0  0  0  35.8  94.5  151.8  207.2
E(T).  in years cJ  - - - 35.0  72.0  115.0  126.0
Optimal Policy
C02 Ceilings  dl  2.4  3.5  4.8  5.7  6.4  7.0
a/ In percent  of World  GDP.  otherwise  specified
bl Optimal  timing is determined  by equation  (8) which assumes  that the level  of irreversible
damages  would remain  the same  than if the action was taken 1rom  the start.
cl Optimal  timing accounting  for the increase  over the waiting period  of the irreversible  damages.
di Optimal  C02 ceiling  to be implemented  from 1990 to 2275
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